INTRODUCTION
A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been completed for the Space Shuttle with NASA sponsorship and involvement. A significant portion of the data collected by NASA for the Space Shuttle consists of faults, which are not yet failures but have the potential of becoming failures if not corrected. This fault data consists of leaks, cracks, material anomalies, and debonding faults. To utilize this data and to make realistic predictions, detailed, quantitative fault models were developed for the Space Shuttle PRA. The fault models utilized data on the size, or severity, of the fault to predict the criticality of a future, similar fault occurring during a mission. The fault modeling also accounted for the probability of the fault being detected and the probability of the fault recurring during a mission. The effectiveness of design changes in removing the fault causes was also assessed. Each of these attributes was transformed into a quantitative parameter to provide a quantitative estimate of the probability of the fault being realized as a critical fault in a mission. This estimation process was applied to the recorded fault data base to obtain the total probability of a critical fault occurrence is a mission. Software was developed to automate the calculations in the process. The following sections present the basic methodology used and illustrate applications of the methodology as implemented in the Space Shuttle PRA.
FAULT CRITICALITY POTENTIAL
The criticality potential of a fault of a given size is the potential that the fault can have significant consequences in an accident scenario. For example the criticality potential of a given liquid hydrogen(H2) leak rate in a mission is the potential of the leak being large enough to cause an explosion if there is oxygen and an ignition source. Another example is the criticality potential of an area of debonding occurring, which is the potential that the debonding will cause overheating. The criticality potential is a potential, or likelihood, for consequences. Additional events may still need to occur to actually cause the consequences. The consequences can be loss of crew and vehicle (LOCV) or can be a system failure, etc., depending on the scenario.
The criticality potential of a fault is quantified by estimating its criticality probability which is the probability that the fault is of sufficient size that it can lead to significant consequences. The criticality probability can be modeled using various models. Two models used in the Space Shuttle PRA are the exponential model and the sigmoid model, which is also called the logistic model.
THE EXPONENTIAL CRITICALITY MODEL
An exponential model is one of the most basic models for the criticality probability of the fault. Let P(S) be the criticality probability for a fault of size S. As was indicated, the criticality probability is the probability that the fault can lead to significant consequences in a an accident scenario. The size measure S can be a single measure such as a leak rate value. The size can also be a combination of different fault characteristics.
For the exponential model, P(S) is given by
where A is a fitting, scale parameter. For S=0, P(S)=0. As S increases P(S) approaches 1. The rate of increase of P(S) is determined by the value of A. The parameter A can be expressed in terms of the median size of fault having a 50% probability of being critical. Let m be this median size fault size. Then ( ) 0.5 P m = .
(2) Substituting m into the right hand of Equation (2) By estimating the size m of fault having a 50% chance of being critical, the distribution of P(S) versus S is determined using Equation (5). Equation (5 ) can be used to sum or integrate over fault sizes from recorded fault data to give the total probability of a critical fault occurring . Note that m can be location dependent. Fault sizes at specific locations can be assessed for their specific median fault size that will cause accident consequences as function of location. Faults can be also categorized according to other characteristics and a median critical fault size assessed for each set of characteristics.
THE SIGMOID CRITICALITY MODEL
For the sigmoid criticality model, which is also called the logistic model, the probability P(S) that a fault of size S is critical and can lead to significant consequences is given by
The sigmoid model has two parameters m and b, requiring more information but having more flexibility. The parameter m is the median critical fault size, i.e., is the size of fault having a 50% probability of being critical, ( ) 0.5
(8) The parameter b is the scaling parameter and determines the slope of the probability curve P(S) versus S increases. As b becomes very large, the curve of P(S) versus S approaches a step function that has a value of 0 before m and a value of 1 after m. As b approaches 0, P(S) approaches the horizontal line P(S) = 0.5 for all S. Thus, b defines the discrimination of P(S).
The value of the scale parameter b can be related to a given size fault having a particular probability of being critical (other than the median value). Assume a given size fault S p has a criticality probability of p. Since the criticality probability is p for a fault size S p using Equation (7) we then have the equation
Solving for b,
We now take S p to be a lower bound fault size smaller than the median fault size m. Express S p as a factor f smaller than m, i.e.,
where f is a value bigger than 1 and can be called the range factor, or error factor, for the range of fault sizes having criticality probabilities. Using Equation (11) in Equation (10), the scale factor b can then be expressed as 1
In the software program (called FRAS) that was developed for the Space Shuttle PRA, p is taken to be 0.05 and f is taken to be the 5% factor. Note, as f approaches 1, b becomes large and P(S) approaches a step function at m. As f becomes large, the slope of P(S) becomes more gradual.
COMBINING THE FAULT CRITICALITY PROBABILITY WITH THE FAULT SIZE DISTRIBUTION
The fault criticality probability P(S) applies to a given fault of size S with unit weight. For a given fault, P(S) needs to be multiplied by a fault weight w and then the sum or integration taken over all the faults. The fault weight w gives the applicability of the fault with regard to its future occurrence. For the simplest weighting, each fault is given a weight of unity. More applicable models for given scenarios account for the detectability of the fault and the corrective measures taken to prevent recurrence of the fault. The more detailed estimation of the fault weight is discussed in the next section.
The sum of the critical fault probability P(S) times the fault weight w over the fault sample then gives the total predicted probability of a critical fault occurring in a mission. For a discrete number of fault sizes, P(S k ) and w k are determined for each fault size S k and the sum taken over the fault sizes recorded to give the total fault occurrence probability:
( ) Instead of a discrete distribution, the fault size distribution can be modeled as a continuous distribution. Let f(S) be the fault size density, i.e. the probability per unit size that the fault has size S. The fault size distribution can be a conditional distribution, i.e., the probability of a particular fault size occurring given a fault occurs. The fault size distribution can
RAMS 2004
-383 -U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright also be an unconditional distribution including the probability of a fault occurring, e.g. the probability of a fault size occurring per mission. Furthermore the density f(S) can be a flux, such as the number of faults of size S per unit size. Common distributions used for f(S) are the exponential distribution, normal distribution, and fitted distributions from regression analysis. The fault weight w(S) is also a function of fault size. Using the fault size density f(S), the total probability of a critical fault occurring is then ( ) ( ) ( ) w S f S P S dS ∫ = the total fault probability (15)
In the above, the integral is over all the sizes in the fault size distribution.
If f(S) is a flux its integral can be greater than 1. The above integral then becomes the expected number of occurring faults being critical instead of the probability of an occurring fault being critical. If f(S) integrates to greater than 1, then the expected number is given by the above equation and is then modeled as a Poisson. The probability of at least one critical fault occurring is then taken to be 1-exp(-expected value) using the Poisson relationship between the probability of at least one occurring and its expected value
FAULT WEIGHTING
Recorded faults generally have to be weighted when they are used to predict future occurrences. This weighting accounts for the detectability of the fault, the potential for a similar fault re-occurring during a mission, and the effectiveness of a design change removing the fault causes. The detectability of the fault accounts for the effectiveness of the detection processes in detecting the fault. The mission reoccurability of the fault accounts for the likelihood of a similar fault reoccurring during a mission. The design change effectiveness accounts for the likelihood of a design change removing the root causes of the fault. A value between 0 and 1 is assigned for each of these factors. The weights are interpreted as conditional probabilities. The weights are then combined to give the total weight (total probability) for the fault.
The weight used for fault detectability is actually the fault non-detectablity probability which is one minus the fault detection probability. The fault mission reoccurrence weight is the probability of a similar fault occurring in a mission. It does not have to be the same fault but a similar type of fault. The mission reoccurrence weight does not account for any design changes to remove the fault causes which is considered as a separate factor.
The design change effectiveness weight is the probability, or confidence, that a design change removes the root cause of the fault.
3.1.FORMULA FOR THE TOTAL FAULT WEIGHT

Let
w ND = the non-detectability weight (16) w MR = the mission-recurrence weight (17) w DR = the design residual weight.
(18) Also let w T = the total fault realization weight.
(19) Then w T is computed from the formula w T = w DR (w ND + (1-w ND )w MR ).
(20) The above formula is a combination of conditional probabilities and can be understood as follows. The first factor w DR is the probability of the fault passing through any implemented design changes. If there is no design change then this weight value is one. The second factor w ND is the probability of a future fault not being detected accounting for (conditional on) any design change instituted. The last term is the probability w MR of a similar fault recurring in the mission even if it detected and corrected, accounting for any design changes. 
Report
APPLICATION USING THE FRAS CODE
A spreadsheet-based software package called FRAS was developed in the Space Shuttle PRA to implement the above methodology. ("FRAS" is an acronym for "Fault Risk Assessment Software".) Figure 1 illustrates a sample of fault data used. Figure 1 also illustrates an example of the fault weight values used. Figure 2 is an example of the results obtained. Figure 2 gives the probability of different fault sizes occurring during a mission. These probabilities were then used in Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) and in the Fault Trees in the Space Shuttle PRA.
SUMMARY
One of the modeling techniques used in the Space Shuttle PRA involved extended fault modeling. The fault modeling involved estimating the fault criticality potential, the detectability of the fault, the fault recurrence potential, and the design effectiveness in removing the fault causes. These attributes were translated as probabilities, or weights, to quantify the probability of a critical fault occurring in a mission. The methodology produces estimates of mission faults occurring from observed fault data. The software package FRAS that was developed to analyze the collected Shuttle fault data served to be useful tool to implement the methodology in the Shuttle PRA. Dr. Vesely has been in the risk assessment field for over 30 years. He was a principal author of the first major Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) performed on nuclear plants, WASH-1400. He worked at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a risk specialist, and has been a PRA consultant for the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and for numerous industrial companies. He is an adjunct professor for several universities. He recently served as the technical integrator for the Space Shuttle PRA recently completed by NASA. He is presently employed as a technical risk manager for NASA Headquarters. Dr. Vesely has published over 100 papers and reports on PRA, statistical analysis, data analysis, and expert systems. Fault Size (SCIM) Probability
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